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Abstract. Child labour is pervasive across sub-Saharan Africa. The common assumption is 
that monetary poverty is its most important cause. This paper investigates this hypothesis 
with empirical evidence by exploring structural, geographic, monetary, demographic, 
cultural, seasonal and school-supply factors simultaneously that can influence child labour. 
It is a first attempt in the literature to combine quantitative with qualitative methods to 
identify a broader range of potential factors—on the demand- and supply-side and at the 
micro and macro levels—for why children work in agrarian economies like Ghana. 
Interviews with the Minister of Education and with children enrich the multivariate 
regression results. The multiple sources of child labour appear to include, in particular, the 
structure of the economy, social norms and no returns to rural basic education. Policy 
responses are outlined especially on the demand side that are needed to help reduce 
harmful child labour that affects children’s education and later opportunities. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Child labour is pervasive in most sub-Saharan African countries and it can at times constrain 
the choices and freedoms of children and their education and human welfare later in life. 
About 38% of children aged 7-14 in sub-Saharan Africa are engaged in work (UNICEF 
2005). In Ghana, about one in every six children aged 7-14 are working in 2005/06 (15.6%), 
accounting for about 317,000 children actively working for economic gain. The common 
assumption in the literature—led by the influential, theoretical work of Basu and Van 
(1998)—is that child labour is driven by income poverty. In analysing quantitative and 
qualitative evidence in the agrarian economy of Ghana, this paper tests the hypothesis of the 
“luxury axiom” by Basu and Van that a child only works when household income drops very 
low. Not only has no research topic on child labour received more attention than this 
relationship between child labour and monetary poverty.2 But also much research on child 
labour, while often citing its non-poverty influences, views household poverty as the most 
important determinant.3 This is not unexpected as the majority of papers on child labour are 
written by economists who tend to focus their analysis on the economic sources of child 
labour. 
  
Yet household decisions for or against child labour are rarely the consequence of one single 
factor (for example, monetary poverty) or event (for example, an income shock). Rather, they 
are often—as the case in Ghana—related to a set of events and factors ranging from the 
structure of the economy (which is largely led by family farming), cultural influences (social 
norms viewing child labour as part of socialisation), occupational choices (with no higher 
reported economic returns to basic education in rural areas), to low government priority and 
capacity (to enforce anti-child labour laws), the seasonal demand for agricultural work and, 
among others, demographic variables (such as low parental education and children’s 
‘economic value’ increasing with age). This paper thereby postulates that the ‘luxury axiom’ 
can often poorly define and delimit the realm of analysis on child labour to economic factors. 
Applying it as a point of departure – which is a common approach in the literature – can 
constrain a more holistic, cross-disciplinary understanding of why both poor and non-poor 
children work in agrarian economies like Ghana. 
 
On the empirical side, because most studies do not combine and enrich household survey 
analysis with qualitative data analysis, they often ignore important factors such as cultural 
norms or attitudes about child labour that are generally not well captured in household 
surveys. On the theoretical side, the discussion on child labour is driven by theoretical models 
that at times implicitly claim to identify universal ‘truths’ as they often a priori contain the 
causes of and solutions for why children work. They often neglect the idiosyncratic and 
heterogeneous sources of child labour, i.e. the specific traits of different groups of children of 
different gender and age involved in different economic activities in different geographic 
areas within different countries with different norms and institutions over different seasons 
and time periods. Thus, while a strong interrelationship between household poverty and child 
labour appears intuitive and is argued and modelled theoretically at the global level (e.g. Basu 
and Van 1998; Bardhan and Udry 1999; Dessy and Vencatachellum 2003), this paper argues 
that neither such intuition nor such theory seems to hold strongly with quantitative or 
qualitative evidence in agrarian economies like Ghana. It provides some empirical evidence 
                                                 
2 For a comprehensive overview of this discussion, see Edmonds 2008. 
3 Some examples are: Grootaert and Kanbur 1995; U.S. Department of Labor 2000; Canagarajah and Nielsen 
2001; Blunch and Verner 2001; ILO 2002; Ray 2003; Amin et al. 2004; Edmonds and Pavcnik 2005; Edmonds 
2005; Huebler 2008. 
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against such universal theories and aims to expand the other strand of literature that questions 
the high importance of poverty.4 Results presented here suggest that increases in household 
wealth in Ghana (which have largely been accrued by those in services and manufacturing) 
will not inevitably result in significant reductions in child labour, unless such increases are a 
result of other, more important influencers including a reduction in agricultural dependency 
and thus reduced levels of social acceptance of child labour and greater returns to rural 
schooling. This has important implications on the typical way most economists view and try 
to mitigate child labour, with the paper outlining a different set of needed policy responses. 
 
This paper thus has several contributions to the existing child labour literature. It assesses a 
wider range of potential sources of child labour simultaneously than currently in individual 
papers in the literature that often only focus on a specific issue, allowing here for a broader 
understanding of the importance of potential structural, geographic, monetary, cultural, 
seasonal, and school-supply factors, as well as gender and other demographic traits in a single 
paper. It broadens the standard analytical approach by applying quantitative and qualitative 
methods and thereby provides some new insight into the critical role of social norms in 
influencing the demand for child labour especially in family farming, which is an area not 
well understood in child labour research that typically only applies survey data. It identifies 
potential effects that influence some subgroups but not others by conducting disaggregated 
analysis, for example, on child labourers in and outside of household farming, across 
different seasons of the year and for a number of other subgroups. In contrast, most existing 
studies pool data and neglect the heterogeneity of child labourers which reduces the 
usefulness of results for policy makers. It also offers some insight into why levels of child 
labour can stagnate in growing economies or poverty-reducing economies like Ghana. 
 
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 explains the data sources. Section 3 presents the 
basic descriptive household survey results, enriched by the results from interviews conducted 
in Ghana in 2010. Section 4 describes the statistical model, outlines its methodological 
limitations and illustrates the multivariate regression results, providing some insight into the 
importance of a number of potential sources of child labour beyond monetary poverty. In 
response to the results, section 5 discusses what combination of programmes and policy 
reforms in the short- and longer-term is likely to help mitigate harmful child labour that is 
defined as conflicting with children’s education and thus later opportunities. Section 6 
concludes, while outlining some theoretical and methodological limitations facing economic 
analyses. In particular, the primary objective guiding this paper is to try and identify which 
potential constraints and enabling factors beyond monetary poverty are important—i.e. to 
empirically test the ‘luxury axiom’ in the agrarian economy of Ghana—and thereby to 
identify which policies may be best in mitigating harmful child labour in the country. 
Answers to these questions are critical for policy planners and makers. 
 
 
2. Data sources 
 
This paper is based on research carried out in Ghana between 2010 and 2011, employing 
household survey data together with qualitative interviews and fieldwork trips. This Q-
squared approach allows for a broader and more nuanced understanding of multiple potential 
sources of child labour. 
 
                                                 
4 For example: Barros et al. 1994; Rogers and Swinnerton 2004. 
 4 
 
The Ghana Living Standards Surveys (GLSS) analysed here are vital for the planning of 
Ghanaian development and are commonly used and recognised as one of the most 
comprehensive and reliable sources of household data in the country. GLSS is carried out by 
the Government of Ghana and used as one of the principal means to inform policy by the 
government itself. GLSS is the only nationally representative household survey in Ghana that 
includes an employment activity module and collects information on child labour.5 Data from 
GLSS 2005/06 covers 8,687 households (37,128 individuals) and is the latest available 
survey data at the time of the study and the main data source for the household survey 
analysis here, while data from GLSS 1998/99 covering 5,998 households (25,855 individuals) 
is also applied at times for comparative and robustness purposes. The surveys are stratified by 
region and then urban/rural location and are clustered as census enumeration areas by 
applying the ‘probability proportional to size’ method (for more information on the sample 
design and questionnaire, see GLSS 2008). While these national, cross-sectional surveys have 
limitations on drawing policy implications from the results at the district level, it is possible 
to derive conclusions and discuss policy options on a regional and national scale. 
 
With child labour identified as the leading alternative to schooling in Ghana using GLSS 
household survey data, further insight into the interdependencies between child labour and 
schooling is gathered through an interview with the Minister of Education, Hon. Alex Tettey-
Enyo, on October 19th 2010. The interview allows for a more nuanced interpretation of the 
potential sources of child labour and helps provide further clues and narratives to try and 
disentangle these sources that cannot be well understood alone with household survey data, as 
such data forces dynamic household decisions about child labour into clear-cut quantifiable 
survey variables.6 In addition, as part of the qualitative data collection, fifteen children and 
youth from two schools (one primary and one junior high school) in the capital Accra were 
randomly selected and interviewed after school on September 23rd and 24th 2010 using 
semi-structured questions and methods (see Van Evera 1997). The primary school provides 
services for poorer children while the junior high school for wealthier youth based on the 
author’s observation. While it cannot yield representative information and only represents a 
small sample of urban children and youth (with 51% of all Ghanaians living in urban areas in 
2009) this qualitative field research is only intended to offer additional micro-level insight 
that at times helps enrich some of the results from the household data analysis. Names have 
been omitted to preserve confidentiality. Indication of field research throughout this paper, 
unless otherwise indicated, refers to this data collection.7 
 
In defining child labour, this paper differentiates—in line with the International Labour 
Organisation (2008)—between unharmful assistance with household chores and harmful 
child labour. The latter is defined as the employment of children under the age of 15 on a 
regular basis in work that conflicts with their schooling in order to make a living or 
compliment household earnings, either as a wage worker or through self-employment.8 In 
                                                 
5 However, it is important to note that participatory observations of street children in the capital city suggest that 
the ‘nationally representative’ GLSS survey very likely underestimates the prevalence of child labour (see also 
Edmonds 2008), as GLSS collects data from households and their heads, not from children living alone on the 
streets who may not have parents. 
6 In terms of the semi-structured interview with the Minister, it is important to emphasise that the views 
expressed reflect his subjective standpoint and not necessarily those of the Government of Ghana. Excerpts from 
the interview are found throughout the text (for the transcript of the interview contact the author). 
7 The interviews conducted here target children and the Minister of Education in order to help best complement 
household survey data that only collects information from household heads/parents. 
8 Employing children under 15 is also prohibited under Ghana’s labour decree from 1967, while legislation 
allows for undefined ‘light’ work. According to Article 32 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child from 
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contrast, children in Ghana typically assist with non-economic household chores before and 
after school, on weekends and during holidays such as fetching water and/or wood, cooking, 
washing clothes, buying household items, looking after siblings and other similar chores, 
with children interviewed in 2010 indicating that they contribute on average about 1-1.5 
hours per day to such non-economic household tasks. A definition of child labour is adopted 
here in line with the ILO definition that is used by GLSS and therefore endorsed by the 
Government of Ghana: a child is employed if he or she did “any work for pay, profit, family 
gain or produce anything for barter or home use during the last 7 days” (GLSS 2008).9 Child 
labour and assistance with household chores are thus two separate issues, for which 
respondents are asked separate questions in the GLSS survey. That is, while 87.5% of all 
children aged 7-14 assisted with non-economic household chores in the last 7 days (averaging 
12.7 hours of assistance per child), this paper only focuses on child labour for economic gain 
in which 15.6% of children are active in the last 7 days (averaging 26.3 hours of work per 
child), with the average child labourer also contributing 13.5 hours to household chores in the 
last 7 days. 
 
 
3. Descriptive results 
 
The aim in this section is to first demonstrate that child labour research should not just focus 
on monetary income as many non-poor children are working, and then secondly to lay out 
other potential sources of child labour that demand greater attention. These include the 
country’s agricultural dependency, social norms and a lack of higher returns to basic 
schooling, followed by other factors such as the demand for schooling, the geographic 
distribution of child labourers, demographic factors such as children’s age and parental 
education, and seasonality of child labour (discussed in that order). 
 
In Ghana, 15.6% of children aged 7-14, the age group analysed throughout this paper, are 
working in 2005/06. In merging levels of household consumption expenditure with children’s 
labour participation rates, Figure 1 shows that while 21.7% of children falling into the bottom 
two wealth quintiles are working, labour participation rates remain high for children in the 
middle quintile (12.4%), fourth quintile (8.4%) and richest quintile (4.6%). In terms of the 
geographic concentration of working children, 29% of children in the top three quintiles in 
the North (which incorporates the Upper West, Upper East and Northern regions) are 
engaged in labour activities compared to 34.1% of their counterparts in the bottom two 
quintiles in this part of the country. Illustrating the distribution of child labourers in relation 
to their total household expenditure, Figure 1 also indicates that only in the three regions of 
the North do over 50% of child labourers fall below the national poverty line, while in all 
seven regions of the South most child labourers live in households above the poverty line.10 
Among all child labourers in the country 49.5% live above the national poverty line—i.e. in 
households that are not characterised as subsistence-poor. 
                                                                                                                                                        
1989, to which Ghana is a signatory, “state parties recognise the right of the child to be protected from economic 
exploitation and from performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child’s 
education” (OHCHR 1989). Although the enactment of legislation is an important step to mitigate child labour, 
field research in Ghana illustrates that law enforcement officials generally do not de facto enforce laws 
restricting child labour, while institutional capacity to identify and penalise child labour is constrained, 
especially in rural, agricultural areas. 
9 The prevalence of child labour varies by how labour is defined and how a child is defined, while this paper 
adopts this definition of child labour and a definition of a child as being 7-14 years old, with GLSS collecting 
employment data for those aged 7 and above. 
10 28.5% of the population lives below the national poverty line in 2005/06. 
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In terms of land, children are more likely to work in households owning land, especially for 
those in richer households. In the richest quintile, for example, 9% of all children are working 
in households owning land compared to 2% of children in landless households. Ownership of 
productive assets like land is an important source of wealth and collateral in agrarian 
economies and about half of all households in the country own land. On the other hand, land 
is an opportunity for children to be productively employed, with 70.5% of all child labourers 
living in a household owning land. While 33.1% of all child labourers in the country live in 
non-poor households that own land, only 13.9% of all child labourers live in poor households 
that own no land, illustrating that land ownership can be more closely correlated with child 
labour than household consumption expenditure (see also Bhalotra and Heady 2003). 
 
Figure 1: Labour participation rates for 7-14 year old children by quintile levels/total 
household expenditure, 2005/06 
 
 
Source: Author’s illustration based on calculations of GLSS data. Note: The survey sample for the group of children covers 
7,695 observations nationally, with 5,264 observations for the South and 2,367 observations for the North. Wealth quintiles 
are calculated throughout this paper based on annual household consumption expenditure (including food, housing and other 
non-food items) and adjusted for household size and composition, following the method used by the Government of Ghana 
(for details see Ghana Statistical Service 2007). In the bottom right figure, each dot represents an observation of a child in 
relation to their total household expenditure (in cedis) and their region of residence. 
 
The country’s agricultural dependency is one important factor among a broader range of 
factors that appears to create much demand for child labour. 57% of Ghanaians are 
employed in agriculture, and the share is over 70% in the North. It is therefore not 
unexpected that nearly all child labourers in Ghana at 93.7% are employed in general 
agricultural work that is unpaid (GLSS 2005/06 data),11 whereas over 70% of working 
children in developing countries are engaged in agriculture (ILO 2002). It is important to note 
that the prevalence of child labour remained at 16% for the 7-14 year old population in both 
1998/99 and 2005/06, while employment in agriculture for the total labour force also 
                                                 
11 88.4% of child labourers work on the farm/land, 2.3% on a river/at the ocean (fishing) and 5.1% at home, 
while the remaining 4.2% work in other places. 
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stagnated between 1999 and 2006 at 55 and 57%, respectively.12 In contrast, annual GDP 
growth averaged 5% over the period 1998-2006 (which has been stronger in manufacturing 
and services than in agriculture) and the total poverty headcount at the national poverty line 
reduced from 39.5 to 28.5% over the same period (WDI data), neither of which have led to 
inevitable reductions in child labour. 
 
Child labour on the farm is often viewed as a basic component of socialisation rather than a 
form of exploitation. Social norms or attitudes towards child labour and the role they play are 
poorly understood in child labour research (see e.g. Edmonds 2008; Patrinos and Shafiq 
2010).13 The interview with the Minister of Education provides some insight into their role 
and he culturally relativises child labour as part of life for many farming families, while he 
views, on the other hand, that children and youth should not be formally engaged as wage 
workers. The Minister states: 
“We are doing the orientation and sensitisation for the parents also to understand the issues of 
economic activities for minors—child labour—so that they can desist from holding their children back 
because of economic advantages they have. [...] At the moment, I think we, in Ghana, are at home with 
the farming peoples. But what is happening is that some parents still want to engage their children as a 
way of training them for the future in the occupations in which they are, at the moment, engaged. I 
belong to the old school, where you ‘bring up the child the way he should go’ so that if you are a child 
in a farming family you should be able to learn about farming from your parents. But it is not the major 
issue now. [...] They are engaged because they belong to families undertaking farming. And they are 
just helping their parents. [...] We have family farms and you have to take your children to the farm to 
grow some cassava, to plant some maize in good season and harvest it to supplement the household 
food sources.” 
Social norms can thus help explain why shares of children assist on the farm even within 
households falling into the highest income groups. The Minister highlights that children’s 
contribution to family farming is not only a cultural norm but also has an established, positive 
cultural value and is even cultural heritage worth preserving.14 In line with this rationale, the 
Food and Agriculture Organisation (2010) highlights the positive dimensions of child labour 
and states that “working on the farm or on the fishing boat or herding cattle can, if it doesn’t 
get in the way of school and occurs under safe circumstances, be very valuable. It’s a means 
of acquiring skills, giving children a sense of belonging and cultural identity” (see also 
Grootaert and Kanbur 1995; Canagarajah and Coulombe 1997; Patrinos and Shafiq 2010).15 
Field research suggests that for many Ghanaians, child labour is seen as part of growing up in 
that working, as opposed to just schooling, helps children get better accustomed to the skills 
needed later for employment, i.e. a kind of informal apprenticeship. Beyond core cognitive 
skills mediated in school such as literacy and numeracy, working with parents on the farm 
could be viewed as a complement to school as it can mediate not only technical skills needed 
for farming but also non-cognitive skills such as work habits (greater effort and discipline), 
behavioural traits (self-confidence) and physical characteristics (greater physical strength and 
endurance). This questions the common view that benevolent parents do not want their 
children to work – a strong assumption defended by Basu and Van (1998). It is however 
likely that some parents believe that they are being benevolent if their children are spending 
time and working with them, learning their trade and acquiring such practical life-skills. 
                                                 
12 Likewise, value added agriculture as a share of GDP did not reduce but rather remained stable at 40% in 1998 
and 41% in 2005 (WDI data). 
13 See also Berlan (2013) for a study that employs ethnographic methods to examine potential socio-cultural 
influences on child labour within the Ghanaian context. 
14 It is possible that cultural norms may be – at least in part – endogenous to some economic characteristics in 
the longer run, especially the country’s agricultural dependency. 
15 Humphries (2011) illustrates that during the British Industrial Revolution parents also often viewed work as 
more beneficial for their children than schooling in terms of the competences acquired. 
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Some parents working on the farm will also want their children with them as they can be 
better supervised when not in school, while conceivable that (especially older) children 
would then assist their parents rather than just watch them work. 
 
Basic descriptive evidence suggests that much child labour in the country is not economically 
necessary or a result of poverty given the quantitative evidence from GLSS that 9% of all 
children in households in the richest quintile that own land are working (assisting) in family 
farming, together with the qualitative evidence from field research and from the Minister 
about his own children assisting on the farm during planting and harvest seasons. Even 
though the vast majority of child labourers work on a family farm, there are other forms of 
child labour in the country ranging from those who chase tro-tros (mini-buses) in motion to 
sell products like fan-ice (ice-cream), to others who are exploited or engaged in bondage 
labour within fishing communities, as participatory observations in 2010 illustrate.16 
 
The principal occupation of child labourers (agricultural work) typically involves assisting 
with planting and harvesting crops (primarily maize, yam, cassava), watching over animals 
during harvest seasons and/or ensuring that birds do not damage crop fields, as field research 
in 2010 illustrates. In certain cases some children can nonetheless be exposed to chemicals 
(fertilisers or pesticides), intense heat, injuries,17 or threats posed by some animals, parasites 
or plants (Edmonds and Pavcnik 2005).18 
 
A lack of higher returns to basic schooling for those employed in agriculture can help reduce 
school demand and increase child labour demand in agricultural households. An important 
result is that the annual income of household heads aged 15 or older who are self-employed 
in agriculture is basically the same for those with no schooling (US$59) as for those with 9-
years of completed basic education (US$56) as shown in Table 1.19 However, those who 
reach this level of schooling but work in another occupational group earn higher average 
annual income. The low returns to education for the large share of self-employed in 
agriculture are of policy concern since lower secondary is generally the highest level of 
education attained in rural areas, so that economic incentives to complete basic schooling are 
largely lacking in a country where most are employed in agriculture. This is important policy 
information because for many households the decision to bring a child or adolescent to the 
field to assist in farming activities or send them to school and for what duration may be 
assessed using cost-benefit analysis. This can involve comparing—for primary school for 
example—the direct private costs per child (GH¢52.81 annually based on 2005/06 GLSS 
data)20 and the opportunity costs of schooling (the forgone earnings from child labour) 
together with the public costs (GH¢91.49 annually based on 2006 government EMIS data) on 
one hand with the future benefits to the household, including income returns, on the other 
                                                 
16 In extreme cases some parents at times deny their children schooling and engage them in illegal gold mining, 
as children were observed mining during school hours in 2010 in Bonsaaso, a poor rural village located in the 
Amansie-West district (Ashanti region). 
17 The ILO (1997) found that children’s self-reported injury rate of working in agriculture is about 12% based 
on child labour surveys. 
18 Yet, while the worst forms of child labour are generally outside of agriculture and include trafficking, forced 
labour, child soldiering, and prostitution, they are rare although difficult to capture in randomised surveys 
(Edmonds 2008). 
19 It is important to bear in mind that income levels are likely higher than reported because individuals active in 
subsistence farming often do not state a portion of their income as it is consumed. 
20 These household expenses for schooling persist despite the adoption of national legislation to abolish fees for 
basic education (World Bank and UNICEF 2009). 
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(see also Krauss 2012).21 That is, parents can gain in the shorter term from children who 
work through their immediate contribution to household productivity and at the same time 
they can save on costs for education if their children do not attend school. In the longer term, 
however, such children can have fewer opportunities and earn less later in life as a 
consequence of a weaker educational background (except when compared to the agricultural 
self-employed with basic education or less – Table 1). Yet some agriculturally-dependent 
households that perceive post-basic education to be unattainable for their children due to the 
associated expenses may be less inclined to send them to primary or lower secondary at all 
given the lack of returns to formal basic education in rural areas and simply train them on the 
farm instead. Many farming families may thereby view child labour as an optimal choice and 
as a kind of practical education that may be more relevant and valuable for their children’s 
future occupation (see also Humphries 2011). 
 
No returns to rural basic education can be explained by agriculture generally requiring little 
formal schooling and farming households requiring much manual labour, with labour (and 
not ‘human capital’) commonly recognised as the principal asset that agricultural households 
own. Field research in 2010 in Ghana also illustrates that demanded skills and competencies 
for those living in rural areas are largely attained through ‘learning by doing’ in family 
farming. Furthermore, although education opportunities in rural areas have begun opening 
from low levels, there are limited possibilities to apply acquired knowledge and skills outside 
of the agriculture sector and thus limited labour mobility, i.e. higher completion rates do not 
appear to have led to many alternative options beyond agricultural livelihoods, especially in 
the formal sector (World Bank 2011). 
 
Table 1: Annual income for household heads aged 15 or older relative to their level of 
skills/education and occupational group, 2005/06  
US$ 
 Level of skills/education acquired: 
Avg. 
income 
# of  
obs. 
 Unskilled Semi-skilled (/skilled) 
(Highly-) 
Skilled 
 No 
education Primary 
Lower 
secondary 
Upper 
secondary TVET 
Higher 
educ. 
National average  127 183 368 763 1,130 3,652 518 7,668 
Public  390 754 1,217 1,761 2,120 4,033 2,130 565 
Wage private formal  846 835 1,130 1,391 1,913 5,185 1,489 613 
Wage private informal  760 771 902 882 1,250 4,815 923 544 
Self-employed, agriculture  59 47 56 117 218 1,446 680 3,603 
Self-employed, business (non-agri.) 33 67 151 224 337 2,467 184 1,890 
Source: Author’s calculations based on GLSS data. Note: Household income is measured here as income from employment, 
which better captures actual earnings related to one’s level of schooling attained compared to using all sources of household 
income including income from rent, remittances and other sources. 6% of respondents are not working, for whom data is 
missing and calculations are not possible. Data for employment in agriculture has been merged to refer to engagement in 
either crop or export agriculture. TVET stands for Technical Vocational Education and Training. 
 
The demand for schooling can compete at times with the demand for child labour, often 
because of labour-intensive agricultural livelihoods. Map 1 illustrates that in the Upper West 
region only two thirds of children attended school (66.9%) and almost half engaged in labour 
activities (44.7%), while at the other end of the spectrum almost all children in the Ashanti 
region attended school (96.9%) and child labour is almost nonexistent there (2.9%). The 
Eastern region is (despite a schooling rate of 97.2%) the outlier in the South for higher levels 
of child labour which is likely in part explained by the direct labour demand within fishing 
communities on Lake Volta, as multiple participatory observations in 2010 illustrate. 
                                                 
21 Beyond such a standard economic cost-benefit analysis, households likely also consider the less quantifiable 
benefits of education including its intrinsic value as an end in itself and its social benefits on improved health, 
reduced fertility, empowerment, among others (Krauss 2012). 
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Map 1: Labour and school participation rates for 7-14 year olds across Ghana, 2005/06 
 
Source: Author’s illustration based on GLSS data. Note: The values reported on each region in the map refer to school 
participation rates, while labour participation rates are reflected by the size of the circle in each region. 
 
Child labour and schooling are not mutually exclusive: 8.6% of all 7-14 year olds combine 
the two. Table 2 illustrates that households are able to decide between one of four choices in 
relation to their children’s work and schooling. 77.2% of children are schooling and not 
working, 8.6% are simultaneously working and schooling, and 7% are working but not 
schooling, while the remaining 7.2% are neither working nor schooling (classified as being 
idle).22 Interestingly, more children combine work with school, which can be facilitated by 
the flexibility of family farming, than those only working.23 In some households children 
may at times take on a job because they are not in school or may be in school because they 
are not currently working. For the most at risk and those living at the level of subsistence, the 
decision can be difficult: a family that decides to send their children to school and 
subsequently lacks sufficient labour on the farm and has a poor harvest could potentially even 
experience an unexpected and negative effect from school. Schooling combined with labour 
can be positive especially when the alternative is to only be working on the farm. 
 
Where and when work demand and rewards at home or within the community are high and 
the returns to education are low such as in rural, farming areas (Table 1), the opportunity 
costs of going to school can be high. The issue of opportunity costs was highlighted in the 
interview with the Minister of Education, who stated that “most of the parents do not think 
that it is easy for them to [...] do away with the services [...] even at that tender age of 5 to 6 
years, some of them [parents] receive services, petty-petty services, from these little 
children.” 
 
Child labourers are highly concentrated within the North. If the South constituted its own 
country, nearly all 7-14 year olds would not be working (92.2%), while if the North formed 
its own country, one third of children would be engaged in labour activities (33.1%). In the 
                                                 
22 It is likely that the actual share of child labourers is higher as there may be measurement error in activities 
classifying children as ‘idle’ especially in relation to domestic work, but also temporary unemployment or 
temporary non-school attendance, or longer-term unobserved health issues—see Biggeri et al. (2003) for a 
discussion on idle status within household surveys. 
23 Yet children who miss school many times are more likely to have to repeat a year or be expelled from school 
while greater flexibility may exist for most children to miss work in family farming.   
Northern 
Upper West 
Upper East 
Brong Ahafo 
Ashanti 
Volta 
Eastern 
Western Central 
Greater Accra 
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North, about half of the children of this age are only attending school (50.6%) and 18.9% are 
only working while 14.1% combine work with school and 16.3% are doing neither. The fact 
that only 1.6% of Southern children are working while not schooling compared to 18.9% of 
Northern children illustrates the extent of the latter group’s strong marginalisation (Table 2). 
Children affected by harmful child labour (conflicting with their education) live therefore 
nearly entirely in the North. 
 
Children’s usefulness or value on the farm increases as they get older or (more accurately) 
physically bigger and stronger. Child labour rises incrementally from 9.9% for 7-8 year olds 
to 15.4% for 9-11 year olds followed by 19.6% for 12-14 year olds. Such trends are also 
found internationally (Edmonds 2008). In addition, there is an increasing demand for older 
children to only be working, as age-specific data in Figure 2 shows (see appendix). 
 
There appears to be a strong intergenerational relationship between child labour and 
parental education as well as agricultural livelihoods (Table 2). The kinds of livelihoods that 
parents pursue seem closely related to whether children work or not, as nearly all child 
labourers are working in family farming, with only 6.3% engaged in non-agricultural work. 
This, together with the fact that only 3.8% of child labourers receive payment for their work 
(see Table 2), does not offer strong evidence for the argument that parents primarily employ 
their children as a source of additional revenue. Otherwise there would likely be a larger 
share of child labourers working outside of family farming for higher earnings in other 
sectors. In addition, children are three times more likely to be involved in harmful child 
labour (without schooling) who live in households owning land (10.3%) compared to those in 
landless households (3.2%). 
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Table 2: Descriptive data on labour and school participation rates for 7-14 year old 
children, 2005/06  
Source: Author’s calculations based on GLSS data. Note: Data that refer to fathers with tertiary education should be read 
with caution given limited observations. *The last column reflects the total prevalence of child labourers whether also 
schooling or not, while the second to last column reflects the total share of school participants whether also working or not. 
The shares of the last two columns are not to add up to 100% as some children are doing both. 
 
An important aspect of child labour that is not commonly analysed in the literature is 
seasonality. Seasonal and temporary labour can follow seasonal and temporary school 
attendance patterns, with Figure 3 illustrating school-labour tradeoffs and a higher prevalence 
of child labour during the major planting and harvesting seasons (see appendix).24 Simply 
engaging children seasonally on the farm is easier for many households than trying to search 
for and hire adult workers willing to work periodically during the peak seasons when 
                                                 
24 Given the survey design of GLSS and that data on each child is only collected at one point in time, there is 
likely some degree of measurement error here as the survey does not include questions on children’s main 
occupation (school or work) throughout the year or whether some may likely only work seasonally. Rather, 
children are classified as labourers if they worked during the last 7 days, as defined in section 2. Furthermore, 
nationally representative panel data on child labour, which could help tackle this measurement issue, is not 
available in Ghana.  
 School, with No schooling, with Total # of obs. School Work    no work work no work work 
National average 77.2 8.6 7.2 7.0 100 7,694 85.8 15.6   
                                                                                           All shares refer to labour or school 
                                                                                                participation rates out of 100%  
Shares are not to 
add up to 100%*   
 Child, parent, household and regional characteristics          
   Age 7-8 78.0 5.0 12.1 4.9 100 1,968 83.0 9.9  Typical 
   Age 9-11 77.6 8.7 7.0 6.7 100 2,832 86.3 15.4  profile 
   Age 12-14 76.2 11.0 4.3 8.5 100 2,894 87.2 19.6  of a child 
  Female 78.0 7.9 7.7 6.4 100 3,716 85.9 14.3  labourer 
  Male 76.4 9.3 6.8 7.5 100 3,978 85.7 16.8  (whether 
  Relationship to head is biological child 76.7 8.7 7.5 7.0 100 5,981 85.5 15.7  also 
  Mother lives in the household 76.3 9.0 7.5 7.2 100 5,976 85.3 16.2  schooling 
  North 50.6 14.1 16.3 18.9 100 2,366 64.8 33.1  or not) 
  South 89.0 6.2 3.2 1.6 100 5,264 95.2 7.8  in the last 
So
ut
h 
  Western 93.1 3.8 2.7 0.4 100 706 96.9 4.3  column 
  Central 94.5 2.5 1.9 1.1 100 565 97.0 3.5   
  Greater Accra 92.0 3.2 4.6 0.2 100 585 95.2 3.4   
  Volta 80.4 7.1 6.8 5.7 100 674 87.5 12.8   
  Eastern 78.1 19.1 1.9 0.9 100 790 97.2 20.0   
  Ashanti 94.6 2.3 2.4 0.7 100 1,327 96.9 2.9   
  Brong Ahafo 87.8 6.0 2.9 3.2 100 617 93.8 9.2   
N
or
th
   Northern 54.5 8.8 15.1 21.6 100 963 63.3 30.4   
  Upper East 52.2 12.3 23.2 12.3 100 684 64.5 24.6   
  Upper West 43.9 23.0 11.4 21.7 100 719 66.9 44.7   
  Father’s level of education: No schooling 66.6 13.1 10.1 10.2 100 994 79.7 23.3   
  Primary 88.4 6.6 1.7 3.3 100 181 95.0 9.9   
  Lower secondary 93.0 5.3 1.1 0.6 100 972 98.3 5.9   
  Upper secondary 97.6 0.6 1.8 0.0 100 167 98.2 0.6   
  Tertiary 98.2 1.8 0.0 0.0 100 55 100 1.8   
  Household owns land 70.1 10.2 9.5 10.3 100 4,118 80.2 20.4   
  Household owns no land  84.5 7.3 4.9 3.2 100 3,319 91.8 10.6   
  Wealth quintile 1 (poorest) 58.1 12.2 15.2 14.6 100 2,287 70.2 26.8   
  Wealth quintile 2 78.4 9.1 6.8 5.7 100 1,693 87.5 14.8   
  Wealth quintile 3 84.3 8.9 3.3 3.6 100 1,480 93.1 12.4   
  Wealth quintile 4 89.3 5.5 2.3 2.9 100 1,267 94.8 8.4   
  Wealth quintile 5 (richest) 93.5 3.2 2.0 1.3 100 967 96.7 4.6   
School location           
  Time to and from school, 0-59 min. 91.5 8.5 .. .. 100 4,915 100 8.5   
  Time to and from school, 60-119 min. 89.0 11.0 .. .. 100 1,094 100 11.0   
  Time to and from school, 120+ min. 84.6 15.4 .. .. 100 391 100 15.4   
School participation rate by hours of class attended last week         
  24 hours or less 86.9 13.1 .. .. 100 1,180 100 13.1   
  Between 25 and 34 hours 91.9 8.1 .. .. 100 2,650 100 8.1   
  35 hours or more 94.1 5.9 .. .. 100 1,306 100 5.9   
                                                                                                  Shares or figures are not necessarily to add up to 100%   
 Avg. number of hours worked in week .. 19.9 h .. 34.1 h .. 1,199 .. 26.3 h   
 Share who received payment for work .. 3.8 .. 3.9 .. 1,199 .. 3.8   
Child labour type           
  Employment in agriculture, unpaid work .. 92.6 .. 95.1 .. 1,125 .. 93.7   
  Employment in non-agriculture .. 7.4 .. 4.9 .. 76 .. 6.3   
Work place in village or town           
  Yes .. 94.4 .. 89.2 .. 1,106 .. 92.1   
  No .. 5.6 .. 10.8 .. 95 .. 7.9   
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especially adult labour shortages are more likely to arise.25 A study by Fentiman et al. (1999) 
found that in rural Ghana some children who are enrolled miss school throughout seasons 
when families need additional assistance on the farm. Likewise, a study in Nigeria observed 
that lower school attendance is common throughout harvest seasons and on days of local 
markets (Francis et al. 1998). 
 
 
4. Regression results 
 
4.1 Regression model and basic results 
 
Research that attempts to identify potential sources of child labour faces the challenge of 
trying to isolate those factors that influence child labour without simultaneously influencing 
schooling. It is likely that child labour and schooling decisions are typically jointly 
determined, as these are interrelated choices about children’s restricted time allocation. Given 
that working and schooling are interdependent decisions (and not mutually exclusive as 
descriptive data show above), bivariate probit regressions are applied here which can permit 
interconnected relationships between these two binary dependent variables. A bivariate probit 
model allows for correlation in the error terms of the child labour regression and the 
schooling regression. This modelling approach – while acknowledging that every statistical 
model has important methodological limitations – may be better suited compared to the most 
common method of analysing child labour independently using for example a logit or probit 
model (see Edmonds 2008). Some researchers apply a sequential probit, see for example 
Grootaert and Patrinos (1998), who make a strong assumption that households first decide if 
a child attends school and then make decisions about a child’s further time allocation. 
 
The bivariate probit regressions conducted here control for the presence of a number of 
individual, parent, household, regional and cluster-level factors, and can help provide some 
insight into potential sources that can influence decisions about child labour—in part building 
on and expanding a model employed in Ghana using older data from the late 1980s and early 
1990s (Canagarajah and Coulombe 1997). The potential correlates of working and schooling 
are examined applying both supply- and demand-side variables. Independent variables 
explored range from sex, parental levels of education, and household wealth,26 to the number 
of household members, household occupation in agriculture/non-agriculture, region of 
residence and, among other factors, education supply indicators (for further information on 
variables and methodology applied, see Table 3). 
 
It is important to note that a number of other factors can influence child labour that cannot all 
be easily measured or captured in household survey data and thus in the regression models. 
These unobservables include factors such as social norms and attitudes about child labour, 
while their importance is highlighted above in the qualitative analysis. They include child 
                                                 
25 Basu and Van (1998) include a substitution axiom in their model that suggests that, from a firm’s point of 
view, child labour can substitute adult labour, and vice versa. 
26 Household wealth is calculated based on annual household consumption expenditure, thereby reducing 
endogeneity in the child labour equation which can arise when using income from employment as a control 
variable as some children receive income for their work. Many child labour studies nonetheless use income as a 
control variable and suffer from greater endogeneity (see e.g. Deb and Rosati 2004; Edmonds 2008). Even using 
household consumption instead of income can lead to some biased results as nearly all child labourers work on 
the farm and thus household food consumption can be endogenous to household food production – this is 
another important methodological constraint in trying to identify potential sources of child labour that is not 
commonly recognised in the literature.  
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decision making processes such as whether some children may at times be working as their 
own choice to be with family members, because they want to work, or even because they 
dislike school. Multiple children interviewed in 2010 indicated that they were beaten at times 
by their teacher in class for arriving late, not completing homework or the like.27 They 
include differences in levels of laziness or intrinsic motivation while working which are 
likely to influence children’s energy levels for example in school or to complete homework. 
They also include differences in parental knowledge about anti-child labour legislation and 
the level of potential enforcement (if any) in their community, among many other factors. 
Such omitted variables can reduce the predictive power of existing coefficients as they can at 
times be correlated with independent variables, so that there would be a correlation between 
the error term and independent variables. The regression models here, while acknowledging 
the important methodological limitations of trying to model such complex human behaviour, 
focus on exploring those quantifiable factors that can help influence decisions about child 
labour found in GLSS survey data.28 It is important to stress that the estimated results do not 
reflect causal effects, that they do not go beyond correlations. 
 
The first model assesses potential effects of demand variables (at the household level) on 
influencing individual choices in favour of or against child labour and schooling, while the 
second model also takes into account supply variables (at the government level) such as 
distance to the nearest school facility and total school expenditure. The results of these two 
regression models are presented in Table 3, while only the last column reflects basic 
descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables applied (for the full sample). Results for 
models 1 and 2 are similar due to the rather limited reported effects of supply variables and 
the results for model 2 are described in the following for simplification purposes. 
 
In terms of gender, the regression results show that overall the difference between 7-14 year 
old boys and girls is not significant in their probability of being engaged in work. This result 
is consistent with previous research in Ghana (Canagarajah and Coulombe 1997). In relation 
to fathers without any schooling (the reference group), those who have at least primary 
education are an estimated 4 to 5% less likely to have their children working while they are 
an estimated 3 to 6% more likely to send their children to school, with controls for individual, 
household, community and cluster factors (Table 3).29 Similar trends are found 
internationally (Brown et al. 2001). It has been argued that the age and presence of siblings 
can affect working patterns of other children in the household (Chernichovsky 1985). This 
influence seems to exist in Ghana but is small, with the odds of children working increasing 
by about one percent with each additional household member aged 5 or below. 
 
A child is estimated to be 7% less likely to work if he or she falls into the richest quintile 
compared to the poorest quintile (the reference group). This does not directly imply that 
poverty is influencing these potential effects but rather—as Bhalotra (2007) points out—that 
some more affluent households may simply place a greater importance on children’s leisure 
                                                 
27 The assumption in the literature however is that adults make the decisions related to their children’s work. 
28 However, further qualitative research with children, parents and teachers on these unobservables could 
provide additional insight into the non-quantifiable factors that can influence child labour. 
29 While levels of parental education often correlate with levels of household wealth, collinearity is not a direct 
issue in the models as wealth quintiles reflect household consumption expenditure (not income from 
employment) and as most Ghanaians are self-employed in agriculture, for which the completion of primary or 
lower secondary education yields no higher returns relative to no schooling (Table 1). On the other hand, 
existing studies often do not control for parental education and thus tend to overestimate the potential effect of 
wealth on child labour, as for example knowledge acquired through education can also influence social norms 
about child labour.  
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or their schooling, for instance. Other factors are also linked to wealth that influence its 
correlation with child labour. Wealthier households and communities are for example more 
likely to use more sophisticated technology and thus be in localities with higher returns to 
education, with the inclusion of such a variable into the model (see section 4.3) reducing the 
reported wealth effect. 
 
Estimated effects of conditions associated with geographic location on labour participation 
appear strong: children who live in the Ashanti region are an estimated 7.5% less likely to be 
working compared to those in the Northern region (the reference group) while those in the 
Upper West region are an estimated 13.6% more likely to work, reflecting a cross-regional 
difference of 21.1% in the likelihood of working, with other factors such as household wealth 
levels held constant. Children in the Ashanti region are an estimated 4.4% more likely to 
attend school in comparison to those in the Northern region (Table 3). Overall, geographic 
location appears to influence child labour much more strongly than it does school 
participation which is likely linked to the high concentration of child labourers in the North. 
 
An important result is that household wealth in Ghana appears to have weaker effects on the 
prevalence of child labour and schooling than the conditions associated with geographic 
location particularly in the North.30 This casts further doubt on the common perception that it 
is mainly just poverty pushing children prematurely into employment and it highlights the 
policy importance of geographic targeting to the North. Given these regression results (Table 
3) together with the descriptive data on this relationship (Figure 1) and qualitative results, this 
paper breaks away from the conventional thinking that child labour is nearly entirely 
explained by monetary poverty. Since the models already control for the lower levels of 
parental education and household wealth of Northerners and, among other factors, their high 
levels of household engagement in agriculture, the strong reported effects of Northern 
residency largely capture the combination of remaining conditions (beyond the control 
variables available in the GLSS survey) associated with living in this part of the country. The 
estimated effects can reflect lower labour mobility into formal sector jobs and higher levels of 
social acceptance of child labour (than in the country as a whole) as the vast majority of 
households are active in agriculture here. The North also has a higher prevalence of drought, 
lower soil fertility and more unpredictable water and resource availability which typically 
generates lower agricultural productivity and output than in southern areas (World Bank 
2010) and can increase the demand for child labour. 
 
Children living in households with one or both parents employed in agriculture (the reference 
group) are an estimated 2-3% more likely to be working themselves compared to children 
with parents employed in the manufacturing or service sector. This reported effect is low 
likely because the very large reported effects of geographic location in the North already 
partly capture these children’s residency in rural areas. 
 
Given that data on household expenditure for education and on distance to school are only 
provided for students (i.e. not for children who do not attend school), these two supply 
variables are calculated here creating the cluster median (the median for a given geographic 
enumeration area used for the national census). The assumption is thus made here that 
educational expenses for households and school distance would be similar within a given 
cluster which the data confirms. These cluster-level variables also reduce potential 
                                                 
30 Testing the model with an urban location dummy (1 or 0) instead of 10 regional dummies shows that the 
estimated effects of urban/rural location are also much stronger than those of all other factors including 
household wealth. 
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endogeneity as household decisions to pay for schooling (and send children to school) can be 
endogenous to decisions about child labour. The school expenditure variable, which reflects 
potential household budget limitations in financing children’s schooling, indicates that higher 
costs associated with education appears to have a non-significant effect on labour 
involvement and schooling, with controls for levels of household wealth and other factors in 
the model.31 Even though school costs account for a large share of household expenditure 
especially among the poorest quintile (16% for public and 30% for private school students), 
they do not appear therefore to be a significant factor in pushing children prematurely into the 
labour force to be able to offset school fees or in pulling children out of school because of a 
lack of funding. Yet in other countries higher school costs do have potential effects on 
increased child labour such as in Pakistan (Hazarika and Bedi 2003) and Bangladesh (Shafiq 
2007). In terms of school distance, estimations illustrate that a distance of less than 30 
minutes (compared to the reference group of over 30 minutes) appears to have a non-
significant effect on working but a positive and significant effect on the prevalence of 
schooling by an estimated 3% (for similar results, see Deb and Rosati 2004). It was expected 
that potential effects of distance on working and schooling would be larger. The reported 
results could be because distances to school in 2005/06 remain relatively long for most 
children largely irrespective of various background characteristics including North/South or 
rural/urban residency, with descriptive data indicating that 22.5% of primary students in the 
country take at least one hour to get to and come home from school.  
                                                 
31 While measuring school quality is difficult with most household surveys including GLSS, Brown et al. (2001) 
and Ray (2003) use school costs at the household level as a rough proxy for school quality, as schools with 
higher costs would on average tend to have higher quality school infrastructure and possibly higher learning 
outcomes.  
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Table 3: Bivariate probit regression results: potential sources of child labour and school participation for 7-14 year olds, 2005/06 
   Demand variables 
(Model 1) Full sample 
Demand and supply variables 
(Model 2) Full sample 
Demand and supply variables 
Children in rural areas only 
Demand and supply variables 
Children in agricultural 
households only   
descri- 
ptive 
data avg. 
Labour 
participation 
School 
participation 
Labour 
participation 
School 
participation 
Labour 
participation 
School 
participation 
Labour 
participation 
School 
participation 
L 0.16 
   S 0.86  Independent variables marginal effect t-ratio 
marginal 
effect t-ratio 
marginal 
effect t-ratio 
marginal 
effect t-ratio 
marginal 
effect t-ratio 
marginal 
effect t-ratio 
marginal 
effect t-ratio 
marginal 
effect t-ratio   
Ch
ild
  
tra
its
 Age 0.657 1.72 0.383 1.41 0.609 1.58 0.368 1.47 0.793 1.28 0.372 0.88 0.437 0.86 0.792 1.94 10.5 Age2 -0.330 -1.23 -0.235 -1.22 -0.318 -1.18 -0.219 -1.22 -0.375 -0.86 -0.166 -0.55 -0.169 -0.47 -0.499 -1.72 -- 
Male (1 or 0) (reference group, female) 0.018 1.68 -0.015 -1.94 0.020 1.85 -0.012 -1.69 0.049 2.75 -0.031 -2.57 0.038 2.56 -0.024 -2.07 0.52 
Own child (1 if relationship to head is biological child, 0 if not) -0.031 -2.00 0.019 1.63 -0.025 -1.58 0.013 1.19 -0.048 -1.96 0.013 0.75 -0.062 -3.30 0.019 1.14 0.77 
Pa
re
nt
al
 
tra
its
 Mother lives in HH (1 or 0) 0.016 1.05 0.026 2.26 0.015 0.97 0.025 2.33 0.027 1.07 0.052 2.99 0.037 1.82 0.035 2.25 0.77 Father’s education, primary (1 or 0) (ref. group, no edu.)   -0.035 -2.33 0.036 4.67 -0.042 -3.05 0.039 5.85 -0.083 -3.70 0.064 6.17 -0.046 -2.14 0.055 4.71 0.07 
Father’s education, lower sec. -0.055 -4.12 0.066 6.41 -0.054 -3.86 0.056 5.92 -0.092 -4.17 0.076 5.21 -0.056 -3.17 0.066 5.01 0.41 
Father’s education, upper sec. or higher -0.054 -3.65 0.042 5.10 -0.049 -3.32 0.034 4.15 -0.086 -3.47 0.056 4.46 -0.115 -10.63 0.077 8.25 0.11 
H
ou
se
ho
ld
 c
on
di
tio
ns
 Wealth quintile 2 (1 or 0) (ref. group, quintile1) -0.018 -1.21 0.009 0.96 -0.013 -0.89 0.006 0.65 0.007 0.29 0.005 0.35 0.001 0.06 0.004 0.28 0.22 
Wealth quintile 3  -0.021 -1.30 0.020 1.96 -0.032 -2.08 0.019 2.05 -0.005 -0.16 0.016 0.89 -0.008 -0.35 0.022 1.35 0.20 
Wealth quintile 4  -0.031 -1.98 0.026 2.61 -0.042 -2.85 0.025 2.64 -0.028 -0.91 0.032 1.90 -0.033 -1.48 0.026 1.57 0.17 
Wealth quintile 5  -0.074 -6.12 0.036 3.89 -0.069 -5.70 0.027 2.77 -0.107 -5.02 0.062 5.54 -0.088 -5.83 0.053 4.23 0.13 
HH occupation in non-agriculture (ref. group, agriculture) -0.027 -2.11 0.015 1.65 -0.024 -1.86 0.016 1.84 -0.027 -1.20 0.016 1.09     0.51 
With each additional HH member aged 0-5 0.014 2.23 -0.007 -1.69 0.014 2.27 -0.007 -1.85 0.013 1.33 -0.009 -1.43 0.012 1.42 -0.009 -1.36 1.0 
With each additional HH member aged 6-14 0.004 0.95 0.004 1.06 0.002 0.52 0.005 1.44 0.002 0.25 0.009 1.75 0.002 0.32 0.007 1.46 2.7 
With each additional HH member aged 15-59 -0.003 -1.05 0.005 2.25 -0.003 -1.00 0.006 2.37 0.000 0.07 0.005 1.37 -0.003 -0.66 0.007 1.95 3.0 
With each additional HH member aged 60 or older -0.012 -1.30 0.008 1.36 -0.008 -0.90 0.006 1.01 -0.016 -1.16 0.010 1.07 -0.015 -1.36 0.009 1.02 0.3 
Re
gi
on
al
 a
nd
 c
lu
ste
r 
ch
ar
ac
te
ris
tic
s 
Western region (1 or 0) (ref. group, Northern region) -0.048 -3.03 0.037 4.49 -0.040 -2.30 0.028 3.03 -0.098 -4.65 0.052 3.77 -0.071 -4.14 0.055 4.69 0.09 
Central region -0.065 -4.92 0.042 5.36 -0.074 -6.60 0.040 5.50 -0.135 -9.33 0.062 5.07 -0.104 -9.57 0.060 5.41 0.08 
Accra region -0.044 -2.51 0.020 1.69 -0.043 -2.31 0.008 0.53 -0.079 -2.70 0.007 0.26 -0.056 -2.27 0.003 0.12 0.08 
Volta region -0.038 -2.18 0.033 3.79 -0.023 -1.11 0.032 4.14 -0.049 -1.53 0.052 3.97 -0.025 -0.89 0.043 3.17 0.10 
Eastern region 0.063 1.95 0.046 5.83 0.062 1.79 0.042 6.00 0.027 0.60 0.070 6.37 0.038 0.94 0.063 6.34 0.11 
Ashanti region -0.082 -5.90 0.054 5.89 -0.075 -5.10 0.044 4.84 -0.132 -6.24 0.070 5.00 -0.085 -4.65 0.064 4.81 0.18 
Brong Ahafo region -0.042 -2.51 0.045 6.32 -0.040 -2.46 0.039 5.67 -0.062 -2.23 0.064 5.92 -0.056 -2.75 0.061 5.59 0.08 
Upper East region 0.018 0.65 -0.033 -1.49 0.028 0.97 -0.027 -1.34 0.014 0.36 -0.034 -1.13 0.026 0.77 -0.042 -1.41 0.08 
Upper West region 0.138 3.18 -0.010 -0.59 0.136 3.13 -0.001 -0.04 0.174 2.99 0.003 0.14 0.145 2.95 -0.008 -0.35 0.09 
Total school expenditure, lowest tercile (ref. group, highest tercile)       -0.012 -0.74 -0.014 -0.99 -0.053 -2.06 -0.007 -0.33 -0.013 -0.58 -0.018 -0.89 0.33 Total school expenditure, middle tercile     -0.022 -1.66 0.001 0.12 -0.051 -2.24 0.023 1.33 -0.022 -1.13 0.005 0.28 0.33 Distance to school, 0-29 min. (ref. group, 30 or more min.)     -0.002 -0.17 0.033 2.63 0.012 0.57 0.034 1.97 -0.002 -0.10 0.049 2.68 0.76  Constant  -2.69 -2.92 -1.48 -1.46 -2.51 -2.59 -1.88 -1.72 -2.28 -2.07 -1.67 -1.35 -2.02 -1.82 -2.57 -2.14  
 Sample of children 2,385 2,214 1,389 1,406  
Source: Author’s regression results based on calculations of GLSS data. Note: T-ratio shows if a variable’s significance level is over 95% if >1.96 or <1.96. HH stands for household. The last 
column reflects basic descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables applied for the full sample; additional tables of summary statistics including values on minimum, maximum, and standard 
deviation are not included due to space limitations. Total school expenditure includes costs for school and registration fees; contributions to PTA; uniforms and sports clothes; books and school 
supplies; school transportation; food, board and lodging; expenses on extra classes; and in-kind expenses. Total school expenditure is divided into terciles, i.e. the lowest school expenditure 
tercile reflects clusters that spent on average GH¢0 - GH¢14.30 (new cedis), the middle school expenditure tercile spent GH¢14.31 - GH¢43.80 and the highest school expenditure tercile 
GH¢43.81 - GH¢700.00. Age2 represents age squared and is included in order for the regression to allow for non-linearity in age. To capture a larger sample of children, mothers’ level of 
education has been withdrawn from the initial regression design, for which reported effects are similar to fathers’ level of education. 
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4.2 Running split regressions 
 
Most papers pool data on child labour in household farming with labour for outside 
employers and also pool data for rural and urban sectors within the economy, for children of 
different age groups, across wealth levels, and over different seasons of the year. Because 
such aggregation can hide potential effects that influence some subgroups but not others, the 
following model specifications address and disaggregate these issues. Table 3 shows the 
regression results applying the variables in the second model (demand and supply model) but 
only for children in rural areas as well as only for children in agricultural households (in 
which either one or both parents are employed in agriculture). Relative to the results for the 
full sample in the second model, results only for rural children illustrate that the likelihood to 
be working increases (and schooling decreases) for rural boys in general and for all rural 
children living in the North compared to the South. These differences in reported effects for 
rural children are similar to the differences in reported effects for children in agricultural 
households. An important result is that the estimated effects of household wealth on child 
labour in agricultural households and in rural areas (where nearly all children work) become 
very small and non-significant across all wealth quintiles except for the richest 20% of 
households, providing further evidence against the ‘luxury axiom’ particularly for rural and 
agricultural areas. 
 
Table 4 presents the estimated results of split regressions for children by household wealth 
levels, by season of the year and by age (see appendix). Results only for children in the 
poorest quintile illustrate that there is a bias against poor boys, as they are much more likely 
to be working and much less likely to be schooling. Limited research exists on the role of 
seasonal child labour. With GLSS 2005/06 collecting monthly data from the 4th of 
September 2005 to the 3rd of September 2006, Table 4 presents the results for the subgroup 
of children surveyed during the harvesting and planting seasons from November through 
April (i.e. during the months with greater levels of child labour, see Figure 3). Results show 
that children become even more likely to work in the Northern region relative to the regions 
across the South during this period. On the other hand, the estimated effects of geographic 
location on schooling become smaller. Among wealth quintiles, only households in the 
richest quintile appear to have a statistically significant effect on reducing child labour, while 
there is no significant wealth effect on children’s schooling, which may both illustrate the 
stronger overall demand for children to assist on the farm during this period of the year. 
Other estimates of sub-groups for the full model, for example by geographic location in the 
North and South, constrain the sample and are not possible. 
 
4.3 Testing other variables, assessing potential sources over time, and conducting further 
analyses 
 
A range of other variables are individually included into the second model to test whether 
they may influence the decision for children to engage in work or go to school. In including 
variables to indirectly capture an aspect of social norms, results show that the potential effect 
of different religious affiliations or ethnicity on working is not significant. Yet results suggest 
that Muslims and Christians may possibly place a greater value on formal education as 
children in these households are an estimated 4 to 9% more likely to attend school, 
respectively, relative to Animists, the reference group (for similar results, see Canagarajah 
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and Coulombe 1997).32 In terms of land ownership, children in households that own land are 
an estimated 5% more likely to work. Interaction terms between wealth quintiles and land 
ownership are also tested and illustrate that children living in land-owning households within 
poorer quintiles are more likely to work than those in land-owning households within richer 
quintiles. 
 
To estimate the potential effects of returns to education on child labour and schooling, mean 
income from employment by paternal levels of education is calculated for the cluster average. 
Income from employment is aggregated at the cluster level for several reasons. One, this 
reduces endogeneity with any income gained by children in the same household. Two, many 
child labourers live in villages where reported income from employment is not always 
common, constraining thereby aggregation at low geographic levels. Three, aggregation at 
higher levels would not allow for sufficient variation in income from employment between 
districts or regions. At the same time however, a limitation of any analysis estimating the 
potential effects of returns to education is that it is not possible to easily discern whether 
parents make decisions based on current returns or possibly on expected future returns. This 
analysis here, acknowledging such limitations, applies current returns that are averaged at the 
cluster level and then divided into terciles. In clusters with the highest returns to primary 
education (tercile 3), children are an estimated 5% less likely to be working and 2% more 
likely to be schooling relative to those living in clusters with the lowest returns to primary 
(tercile 1), while also controlling for mean income from employment at the cluster level and 
levels of fathers’ education and household wealth. These results suggest that child labour may 
respond to higher returns to primary schooling and that raising returns may increase 
incentives to send children to school. 
 
To try and test the ‘luxury axiom’ with a possible exogenous source of variation, a variable is 
included into the second model on whether children received a scholarship during the past 12 
months. Results show that recipient children are an estimated 4% more likely to attend school 
while the estimated effect on reducing child labour is not significant. This may suggest that 
any potential effect of the scholarship on increasing school attendance is more likely to be a 
result of attracting idle (‘inactive’) children or child labourers who then combine work with 
school, rather than a corresponding reduction in child labour. Increasing school participation 
through such education subsidies will thus not inevitably reduce child labour, as school and 
work are (as mentioned) not the inverse of each other for the majority of child labourers. As 
another possible exogenous source of variation, including a variable for whether households 
received any domestic or foreign remittances in the past year (accounting for 35% of 
households) illustrates that children in recipient households are an estimated 2% more likely 
to attend school but the estimated effect on child labour is not significant. Thus, both of these 
exogenous variables, which raise households’ disposable income and significantly increase 
the likelihood for children to attend school, have no significant reported effect on child labour 
and provide further evidence against the ‘luxury axiom’ in agrarian economies like Ghana. 
 
While the entire paper analyses child labour defined as working for economic gain, a model 
is tested here using total hours spent on non-economic household chores as a dependent 
variable and using the same controls as in the second model. Results show that both girls and 
non-poor children are significantly more likely to do household chores. An interesting result 
is that children across Southern regions (where child labour is least pervasive) are more likely 
                                                 
32 The potential effects of religious affiliation or ethnicity nonetheless likely have little policy relevance relative 
to many of the other analysed variables, especially in terms of targeting government programmes due to issues 
associated with social stigma. 
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to be doing household chores than Northern children (see also Figure 4). That is, in the North, 
where agricultural livelihoods are most present, children’s time is biased towards working for 
economic gain on the farm whereas in the South, where agricultural livelihoods are least 
present, children’s time is biased towards assisting with household chores. 
 
To assess factors across survey years for why children work for economic gain, Table 5 
presents the regression results for the demand model and the demand and supply model using 
the GLSS survey from 1998/99 and compares the results with those from the 2005/06 survey. 
In describing the results for the demand and supply model, conditions associated with 
geographic location in the Northern region relative to different regions of the South appear to 
have the strongest and most consistent effects on increased child labour and reduced school 
participation in the country over both survey years. Compared to 2005/06, the estimated 
effects of household wealth on child labour were smaller and non-significant across the 
bottom four quintiles in 1998/99, with only children in the richest quintile being less likely to 
work. 
 
An additional exercise with the 2005/06 survey is conducted using a probit regression with 
labour participation as the dependent variable and including all control variables in the 
demand and supply model while also including school attendance. To reduce endogeneity 
associated with such a model (the interdependencies between schooling and working), a 
child’s actual school attendance is not used but rather school attendance rates for the cluster 
mean are calculated and then divided into terciles. Results suggest that there are no large 
differences in the estimated effects of the remaining parameters. Relative to children living in 
clusters with the lowest school attendance rates (tercile 1), those in clusters with the middle 
or highest school attendance rates are an estimated 4 to 8% less likely to be working, 
respectively. The reported school attendance effect on reduced child labour appears thus 
larger than that of levels of household wealth and fathers’ education. In addition, a probit 
regression with interaction terms is conducted for children involved in harmful child labour 
(i.e. children attending school are omitted from the sample), with boys living in an 
agricultural household in the North being most strongly and significantly affected by harmful 
child labour. The point at which child labour and schooling are thus more likely to become 
substitutes rather than complements is especially when children have these three traits. After 
discussing the regression results, the next section outlines policy and reform options. 
 
 
5. Policy implications 
 
This paper, first, tries to identify which potential constraints and enabling factors of child 
labour beyond monetary poverty may be critical and, second, which policy and reform 
approaches may then be best in reducing harmful child labour. Each step is incomplete 
without the other. Together they are crucial for planners and policymakers. Yet linking 
applied research to policy design is often lacking or rather rudimentary in child labour 
research, particularly context-specific policy design (cf. Bhalotra and Tzannatos 2003; 
Edmonds 2008). 
 
Results suggest that demand-side variables and thus policies (that influence household 
demand) appear currently more important than school supply variables (school expenditure 
and distance) which often have a more limited or non-significant estimated effect on 
influencing labour and school participation in the country on a whole. Because access to 
basic education is often seen in the literature as the most effective way to reduce child labour 
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(e.g. UNICEF 2007; Overhoff 2006), this paper provides alternative evidence, especially as 
most child labourers are already in school. 
 
In terms of the country’s strong agricultural dependency, school calendars could be matched 
to farming calendars in relevant rural communities as a shorter-term policy measure that 
synthesises working with schooling. Educational policies that do not consider local 
community needs can inadvertently have negative potential effects on rural livelihoods 
insofar as they may oblige some households to choose between either work or school. In 
raising the question during the interview about potentially modifying the school calendar to 
accommodate planting and harvest times, the Minister of Education responded that: 
“This idea of making the school terms match the farming seasons of the country has been examined. 
[...] the first NDC [National Democratic Congress] Government even asked that we look at the 
vacation periods; and even if we should have four terms, four academic terms within the year, so that 
the farming seasons—the minor season and the major season—will be set free for schools to release 
their students for work on the farms; [then] we should do so. [...] And, at any rate, we have land 
preparation periods and all sorts of periods related to farming.” 
Given the strong seasonal labour demands for children in farming families (Figure 3) and 
given the general societal acceptance of safe forms of child labour, education authorities need 
to consider adopting a flexible school calendar. Such a calendar could adjust starting dates 
and holiday periods to better reflect farming seasons, although it should, if adopted, only 
affect relevant communities: those mainly in the rural North with school-age children who 
are out of the school system, or go in and out of school during agricultural periods.33 Such a 
policy measure, while it could possibly even increase children’s seasonal work on the farm, 
would help raise school participation.34 
 
Results here suggest that social programmes designed to offset the opportunity costs of 
schooling and thus reduce the time spent in child labour are likely to have limited success if 
they do not target rural households with farming livelihoods, especially in the North. Existing 
demand-side policies need to be therefore reformed. First, the capitation grant – which was a 
key policy in stimulating school enrolment growth between 2004/05 and 2007/08 by helping 
households offset ‘private costs’ for schooling – needs to improve its targeting mechanism by 
transferring funds to Northerners instead of nationwide allocations. Spatially targeting 
Northerners would have much lower administrative costs than its current targeting structure. 
Such a reform would increase efficiency in implementing public resources and help achieve 
the policy’s objective of universalising basic attendance while it would require no additional 
funding as grant allocations would simply be redistributed (see Krauss 2012). Second, 
Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) is a cash transfer programme adopted in 
2008 conditional on no child labour involvement, health visits and school attendance, but 
there is room for improved targeting efficiency by better targeting the programme to 
                                                 
33 Also, a study of African countries by Eagle (2006) finds that some children would not mind attending school 
on weekends in exchange for being able to take off on the market day, questioning also the appropriateness of 
the conventional Western weekend for all school contexts. 
34 An example of such a scheme is the School For Life programme in the North. School hours are agreed upon 
with the community and its school year has a nine month cycle and operates during the North’s dry season, 
allowing children to assist their parents on the farm during its rainy seasons (Akyeampong 2004). Field research 
illustrates that the programme’s volunteer teachers who generally have some secondary schooling are hired 
locally and communities remunerate them with ‘soap money’, the equivalent of a few cedis per month or 
enough to purchase soap. Tens of thousands of children have been reached through the programme who 
otherwise would have likely remained excluded from school (Akyeampong 2004). Scaling up this programme 
especially in the North can be a viable policy option in the shorter term, with very low operational costs needed 
to increase attendance among out-of-school child labourers. 
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Northerners as well (for an analysis of the programme, see World Bank 2010a).35 Third, a 
reformed School Feeding Programme (a free school lunch scheme) that actually targets (i) 
poor, (ii) malnourished and (iii) out-of-school children especially in the North, none of which 
are currently targeting criteria, is also a necessary and viable policy approach to better 
incentivise school participation and mitigate harmful child labour. Overall, the social 
programmes in the country that currently have the largest potential at the micro level to 
reduce child labour either have a limited scope (LEAP), are spatially blind (capitation grant), 
are very poorly—if not inversely—targeted (school feeding programme) or suffer from a 
combination of these (for an in-depth analysis of these programmes, see Krauss 2012). Thus, 
better targeting existing programmes and safety nets to the North is needed so that child 
labour itself is not viewed as the safety net for some disadvantaged households. Yet such 
subsidies and safety nets are in general more likely to increase school participation than to 
reduce child labour. 
 
In relation to the school-labour complementarities, universalising basic school attendance 
would nonetheless likely also help decrease child labour and reducing child labour would 
likely also help universalise basic school attendance in the longer term – even though (as 
shown) many children are able to combine the two. This apparently interlocking relationship 
is not a ‘catch 22’ given some of the policies outlined here and given that public intervention 
in other countries has been able to simultaneously link large reductions in child labour to 
large increases in schooling, particularly through demand-side schemes like conditional cash 
transfers to households such as Bolsa Família in Brazil. An improved LEAP policy also has 
such a potential in Ghana. 
 
In analysing the country’s economic structure it is almost logical that the demand for child 
labour—particularly in the North—is high as the majority of households have agricultural 
livelihoods that require much manual labour and children are a cheap and flexible source of 
labour within the household. Further reducing the agricultural dependency of the economy 
and the share of households active in family farming in the longer term would also support in 
mitigating child labour, as only about 6% of all child labourers in the country are engaged in 
non-agricultural work. A structural shift of the economy away from family farming in the 
long run would need to be coupled with policy interventions that widen access at the 
secondary and tertiary education levels in rural and Northern areas and that help expand the 
formal job market outside of agriculture for graduates. Over time this would help raise the 
social value of and economic returns to education in rural areas and decrease the need for 
child labourers on the farm.36 
 
In terms of data collection, as household surveys can at times underestimate the prevalence of 
child labour (see Section 2), the Ghana Statistical Service should assess the feasibility of 
collecting a broader sample of data on street children by conducting an additional module for 
example in GLSS (or a separate, more specialised survey that only interviews child labourers) 
                                                 
35 LEAP is aimed at positively discriminating selected poor families within the lowest quintile with income 
substitution – while field research illustrates that conditionalities are not always monitored or enforced. 
36 In terms of the social value of education, Edmonds (2008) finds that, internationally, awareness and 
information campaigns are in general the most commonly adopted policy intervention aimed at reducing child 
labour. But sensitisation seminars for parents (despite the importance of parental education and social norms in 
the analysis) are likely only to influence those parents who do not view child labour as an optimal choice due to 
reasons such as low returns to schooling.  
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to gather data from non-household units.37 This could help gain an even richer 
comprehension of the potential sources and consequences of the urban phenomenon and 
thereby help formulate more coherent and efficient policies for urban areas.38 Finally, since 
nearly all child labourers are informally working in family farming, popular policies such as 
introducing a minimum wage or trade sanctions against products made by children will likely 
have a very limited, if any, potential effect in such agrarian countries like Ghana. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This paper explores structural, geographic, monetary, demographic, cultural, seasonal and 
school-supply factors that can influence household decisions about child labour. The main 
objective has been to try and identify a much broader range of potential sources beyond 
monetary poverty for why children in Ghana are working—i.e. empirically and 
interdisciplinarily test the ‘luxury axiom’ in this agrarian economy—and thereby help to 
inform decision-makers and actors who draft and implement public policy of possible ways 
to help mitigate harmful child labour. 
 
The paper here highlights some of the limitations of the popular but simplistic, theoretical 
idea in textbook economics of a ‘luxury axiom’ by Basu and Van (1998) when applied to 
empirical data in an agrarian economy. First, their focus on the “economics of child labour” 
can provide insight into some of the economic aspects of why children work but there is a 
much broader, interdisciplinary story here that includes other important factors such as, 
among others, cultural, demographic and education influencers. Second, this disaggregated 
analysis highlights important differences across subgroups of children (e.g. in 
agricultural/non-agricultural households), across seasons of the year (harvesting/non-
harvesting periods) and, among other factors, across geographic areas (e.g. rural/urban), 
which are not easily captured in their theoretical model. Third, in efforts to inform policy a 
focus on the ‘luxury axiom’ could help alleviate poverty-related forms of child labour but – 
as this study illustrates – it would not lead to the best designed and targeted policies to 
mitigate the different non-poverty-related forms of child labour. This paper has attempted to 
provide a more holistic, interdisciplinary approach using both quantitative and qualitative 
methods and thus to offer a broader understanding of why both poor and non-poor children 
work in agrarian economies like Ghana. 
 
From a methodological perspective, it is important not to view the results here as definitive 
findings and as separate from the methods used to arrive at them – as any analysis examining 
complex human phenomena like child labour faces important measurement constraints. An 
example is that the standard approach in the literature of categorising whether children are 
working or not (as a binary variable) or whether they are in school or not (also as a binary 
variable) neglects the complexities of these dynamic phenomena with their many shades of 
                                                 
37 Analysis on street children—and possibly child trafficking that is known to be practised on Lake Volta—is an 
area that warrants further research in Ghana, although some preliminarily research has been conducted (see 
Kwankye et al. 2007). 
38 Another potential area for further research that also depends on better survey data collection on children is 
related to children’s decision making process regarding work (as discussed earlier), while much research already 
exists on parental and household choices. It is important to note that differences in methodologies – not only 
related to how survey questions are designed and whether only household heads (or rather also children 
themselves) respond to questions about child labour but also which research methods are used and, among other 
things, how results are interpreted – lead to unavoidable variations in how child labour is captured with data 
across different surveys and thus how it is understood. Combining data sources and methods is thus critical. 
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grey. It forces variation among observations into black or white categories, it forces 
individual children into two artificial numerical categories of working or schooling. Such 
variables – which are defined by a researcher to try and precisely capture whether children 
participate in school or work and thus are made mathematically precise and amendable for 
statistical analysis – cannot always take into consideration if children enrol but never attend 
school, only attend school or work one day a month or only for an hour a day, if they 
currently do not attend school because their teacher is absent or their school is temporarily 
closed or, among many other things, if they currently do not work because it is not a planting 
or harvesting period for their family’s particular crops—all of which can influence children’s 
participation in school and work in countries like Ghana. How we precisely define our 
variables and how we make them measurable is however restricted by the specific data that 
can be made available which predetermines the specific type and scope of possible 
correlational or ‘causal’ claims that can be made about child labour – or any phenomenon for 
that matter. Generating correlational or ‘causal’ conclusions is thus limited to those aspects of 
human phenomena that we can force into simplified, quantifiable categories and thus make 
claims about their probability of occurrence (see also Krauss 2015). 
 
Beyond the methodological constraints, we need to make the best of available data to inform 
policy, while acknowledging the important limitations of data and also being more modest 
about the possible scope of our results. This paper has tried showing that in economies like 
Ghana – in which most households and nearly all child labourers are working in family 
farming – agricultural livelihoods and land ownership appear to be important explanations for 
why children are working including large shares of non-poor children in such households, as 
farm work generally requires intensive manual labour. Consequently, the demand for child 
labour seems to be maintained because of its established, often positive cultural value in 
society, on one hand. On the other, returns to child labour in family farming appear often 
high because of a lack of returns to formal education up to the basic level in rural areas. 
Given this lack of returns, together with labour-intensive agricultural livelihoods and the 
social acceptance of child labour, many farming families may view child labour as an optimal 
decision, so that training children on the farm can be seen at times (not as some hazardous 
activity but rather) as a kind of ‘informal’ education for their children’s future occupation. 
Child labour in Ghana appears to be thus largely about the country’s agricultural dependency, 
social norms and no returns to rural basic education. By trying to disentangle the empirical 
data for specific subgroups most involved in child labour, this paper shows that two standard 
economic assumptions do not hold very strongly for many agricultural, land-owning 
households: that child labour is just the result of low levels of income and that basic 
education provides greater income returns. Results from the quantitative and qualitative 
analysis thus suggest that for the government to simply focus on poverty reduction, economic 
growth or school participation will likely not be sufficient in tackling child labour, because 
many child labourers live in non-poor, land-owning households, because growth has been 
stronger in manufacturing and services than in agriculture and because most child labourers 
already combine work with school. This simplistic view is why theoretical and empirical 
papers (as cited in the introduction) are often left without viable answers when analysing why 
levels of child labour can stagnate in poverty-reducing economies or growing economies or 
countries with expanding levels of education like Ghana. 
 
The analysis illustrates that children involved in harmful child labour (who are not able to get 
an education) are nearly entirely concentrated in the North. Specific policy responses outlined 
above to reduce the various potential sources of demand for child labour and to offset the 
opportunity costs of schooling need to place a particularly strong focus on the North, 
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especially on agricultural households in the North (as the regression models with varying 
specifications suggest). Because reducing child engagement in labour activities, particularly 
in those interfering with schooling, would help increase the educational outcomes, later 
opportunities and personal freedoms of many children, the government needs to adopt 
stronger policies to mitigate harmful forms of child labour in the country. 
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Appendix 
 
Figure 2: Labour and school participation 
rates by individual age 7-14, 2005/06 
Figure 3: Labour participation and school 
non-participation rates for 7-14 year olds by 
month, 2005/06 
 
 
Source: Author’s illustration based on calculations of GLSS 
data. Note: The remaining share out of 100% reflects those 
who are neither working nor schooling. 
Source: Author’s illustration based on calculations of GLSS data. 
Note: Harvesting and planting periods reflect the major seasons. 
 
Figure 4: National average child time 
allocation (in hours) over the past seven days 
for all 7-14 year olds by region, 2005/06 
Figure 5: Average child time allocation (in 
hours) over the past seven days for 7-14 year 
old child labourers by region, 2005/06 
  
Source: Author’s illustration based on calculations of GLSS data. Note: Compared to children not working, child labourers have an 
average of 13 hours of less time per week for other activities, such as leisure and play, and are thus more likely to suffer from fatigue. 
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Table 4: Bivariate probit regression results: potential sources of child labour and school participation for 7-14 year olds, 2005/06 
 
 Full sample Children aged 10-14 only Children in the poorest quintile only 
Children in the 2nd to 
5th quintiles only 
Children during the months 
November–April only  
descri- 
ptive 
data 
avg. All split regressions include demand and supply variables 
 Labour participation 
School 
participation 
Labour 
participation 
School 
participation 
Labour 
participation 
School 
participation 
Labour 
participation 
School 
participation 
Labour 
participation 
School 
participation 
L 0.16 
 S 0.86 
Independent variables marginal effect t-ratio 
marginal 
effect t-ratio 
marginal 
effect t-ratio 
marginal 
effect t-ratio 
marginal 
effect t-ratio 
marginal 
effect t-ratio 
marginal 
effect t-ratio 
marginal 
effect t-ratio 
marginal 
effect t-ratio 
marginal 
effect t-ratio   
Age 0.609 1.58 0.368 1.47 -1.037 -0.68 0.636 1.45 1.541 1.32 0.303 0.40 0.376 1.11 0.365 1.74 0.128 0.24 -0.063 -0.30 10.5 
Age2 -0.318 -1.18 -0.219 -1.22 0.734 0.78 -0.390 -1.43 -0.805 -0.99 -0.125 -0.23 -0.203 -0.85 -0.230 -1.53 0.026 0.07 0.086 0.58 -- 
Male 0.020 1.85 -0.012 -1.69 0.023 1.54 -0.004 -0.93 0.094 2.82 -0.068 -3.20 0.005 0.52 0.003 0.57 0.050 3.24 -0.003 -0.56 0.52 
Own child -0.025 -1.58 0.013 1.19 -0.007 -0.32 0.003 0.52 -0.062 -1.36 0.024 0.78 -0.013 -0.86 0.004 0.39 0.012 0.55 -0.012 -1.20 0.77 
Mother lives in HH 0.015 0.97 0.025 2.33 0.004 0.17 0.017 2.33 0.058 1.34 0.000 0.00 0.004 0.28 0.031 2.52 0.017 0.83 0.019 2.08 0.77 
Father’s education, primary (ref. group, no edu.)   -0.042 -3.05 0.039 5.85 -0.048 -2.53 0.016 4.29 0.077 0.80 0.125 6.24 -0.044 -5.01 0.024 4.35 -0.003 -0.10 0.020 3.83 0.07 
Father’s education, lower sec.  -0.054 -3.86 0.056 5.92 -0.053 -2.81 0.021 3.78 -0.089 -1.96 0.102 4.82 -0.040 -3.26 0.039 4.44 -0.052 -2.63 0.026 3.07 0.41 
Father’s education, upper sec. or higher  -0.049 -3.32 0.034 4.15 -0.067 -3.85 0.013 2.81 -0.093 -1.21 0.102 5.88 -0.039 -3.87 0.021 3.41 -0.072 -5.27 0.054 5.06 0.11 
Wealth quintile 2 (ref. group, quintile1) -0.013 -0.89 0.006 0.65 -0.015 -0.74 0.006 1.20         -0.021 -1.05 0.012 1.84 0.22 
Wealth quintile 3 -0.032 -2.08 0.019 2.05 -0.047 -2.44 0.006 1.10         -0.029 -1.39 0.009 1.21 0.20 
Wealth quintile 4  -0.042 -2.85 0.025 2.64 -0.042 -2.06 0.009 1.56         -0.031 -1.40 0.014 1.86 0.17 
Wealth quintile 5  -0.069 -5.70 0.027 2.77 -0.077 -4.64 0.006 0.89         -0.059 -3.10 0.007 0.43 0.13 
HH occupation in non-agriculture (ref. group, agriculture) -0.024 -1.86 0.016 1.84 -0.017 -1.02 0.008 1.56 -0.060 -1.40 0.041 1.67 -0.021 -1.83 0.013 1.74 0.013 0.67 0.011 1.54 0.51 
With each additional HH member aged 0-5 0.014 2.27 -0.007 -1.85 0.017 2.05 -0.002 -0.67 0.006 0.34 -0.012 -1.00 0.016 2.68 -0.007 -2.11 0.010 1.26 -0.001 -0.23 1.0 
With each additional HH member aged 6-14 0.002 0.52 0.005 1.44 0.012 1.93 0.000 0.12 0.005 0.40 0.010 1.03 0.003 0.85 0.002 0.61 0.006 1.03 -0.002 -0.61 2.7 
With each additional HH member aged 15-59 -0.003 -1.00 0.006 2.37 -0.003 -0.68 0.003 1.91 0.000 -0.01 0.009 1.27 -0.004 -1.25 0.004 1.77 -0.007 -1.54 0.002 1.04 3.0 
With each additional HH member aged 60 or older -0.008 -0.90 0.006 1.01 -0.007 -0.60 0.008 2.34 0.019 0.79 0.008 0.55 -0.013 -1.44 0.001 0.31 -0.008 -0.59 0.003 0.59 0.3 
Western region (ref. group, Northern region) -0.040 -2.30 0.028 3.03 -0.019 -0.61 0.011 2.47 -0.163 -5.15 0.082 4.13 -0.008 -0.44 0.013 1.49 -0.062 -3.90 0.020 3.01 0.09 
Central region  -0.074 -6.60 0.040 5.50 -0.079 -4.47 0.039 5.49 -0.186 -9.86 0.093 5.71 -0.049 -5.03 0.024 3.97 -0.080 -6.48 0.015 1.76 0.08 
Accra region  -0.043 -2.31 0.008 0.53 -0.025 -0.76 0.006 0.94 -0.233 -11.14 0.020 0.34 -0.010 -0.50 -0.001 -0.04 -0.068 -4.47 0.002 0.19 0.08 
Volta region  -0.023 -1.11 0.032 4.14 -0.007 -0.22 0.015 4.22 -0.055 -0.79 0.069 2.58 -0.015 -0.84 0.018 2.86 -0.037 -1.71 0.017 2.60 0.10 
Eastern region  0.062 1.79 0.042 6.00 0.079 1.66 0.017 4.50 0.155 1.17 0.060 1.40 0.051 1.58 0.026 4.26 -0.012 -0.42 0.020 3.12 0.11 
Ashanti region  -0.075 -5.10 0.044 4.84 -0.074 -3.42 0.019 3.73 -0.153 -3.68 0.130 6.80 -0.050 -3.67 0.023 2.65 -0.120 -6.62 0.035 4.35 0.18 
Brong Ahafo region  -0.040 -2.46 0.039 5.67 -0.034 -1.30 0.015 4.07 -0.084 -1.51 0.085 3.91 -0.026 -1.73 0.024 4.26 -0.057 -3.32 0.014 1.94 0.08 
Upper East region  0.028 0.97 -0.027 -1.34 0.067 1.51 -0.016 -1.29 -0.005 -0.09 0.004 0.11 0.053 1.35 -0.035 -1.35 0.031 0.76 -0.016 -0.87 0.08 
Upper West region  0.136 3.13 -0.001 -0.04 0.168 2.87 -0.002 -0.27 0.158 2.19 0.030 0.94 0.155 2.07 0.000 -0.02 0.093 1.53 0.002 0.17 0.09 
Total school expenditure, lowest tercile (ref. group, highest tercile)   -0.012 -0.74 -0.014 -0.99 -0.002 -0.07 -0.011 -1.22 -0.071 -1.10 -0.043 -0.91 0.006 0.38 -0.015 -1.06 -0.014 -0.60 -0.020 -1.31 0.33 
Total school expenditure, middle tercile -0.022 -1.66 0.001 0.12 -0.025 -1.38 -0.003 -0.48 -0.096 -1.91 -0.023 -0.41 -0.002 -0.15 -0.001 -0.17 0.007 0.32 0.003 0.35 0.33 
Distance to school, 0-29 min. (ref. group, 30 or more min.) -0.002 -0.17 0.033 2.63 0.002 0.12 0.018 2.20 0.075 2.19 0.044 1.48 -0.031 -1.97 0.027 2.13 -0.041 -1.74 0.006 0.77 0.76 
Constant -2.51 -2.59 -1.88 -1.72 1.33 0.35 -7.05 -1.55 -3.43 -2.03 -0.80 -0.46 -2.39 -2.03 -2.46 -1.76 -1.33 -0.89 0.31 0.20  
Sample of children 2,214 1,471 517 1,697 1,012  
Source: Author’s regression results based on calculations of GLSS data. Note: The same note applies here as in Table 3. 
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Table 5: Bivariate probit regression results: potential sources of child labour and school participation for 7-14 year olds, 1998/99 and 2005/06 
 
1998/99  2005/06  
Demand variables 
Full sample 
Demand and supply variables 
Full sample 
descri- 
ptive 
data 
avg. 
Demand variables 
Full sample 
Demand and supply variables 
Full sample  
descri- 
ptive 
data 
avg. 
Labour 
participation 
School 
participation 
Labour 
participation 
School 
participation 
L 0.16 Labour 
participation 
School 
participation 
Labour 
participation 
School 
participation 
L 0.16 
S 0.89 S 0.86 
Independent variables marginal effect t-ratio 
marginal 
effect t-ratio 
marginal 
effect t-ratio 
marginal 
effect t-ratio  
marginal 
effect t-ratio 
marginal 
effect t-ratio 
marginal 
effect t-ratio 
marginal 
effect t-ratio  
Age 0.286 0.61 0.786 2.38 0.274 0.60 0.784 2.39 10.4 0.657 1.72 0.383 1.41 0.609 1.58 0.368 1.47 10.5 
Age2 0.037 0.11 -0.482 -2.02 0.039 0.12 -0.482 -2.04 -- -0.330 -1.23 -0.235 -1.22 -0.318 -1.18 -0.219 -1.22 -- 
Male -0.017 -1.33 0.042 4.05 -0.017 -1.29 0.043 4.15 0.50 0.018 1.68 -0.015 -1.94 0.020 1.85 -0.012 -1.69 0.52 
Own child  -0.053 -2.42 0.013 0.75 -0.048 -2.20 0.016 0.94 0.75 -0.031 -2.00 0.019 1.63 -0.025 -1.58 0.013 1.19 0.77 
Mother lives in HH  0.031 1.45 0.016 0.96 0.028 1.28 0.011 0.70 0.73 0.016 1.05 0.026 2.26 0.015 0.97 0.025 2.33 0.77 
Father’s education, primary (ref. group, no edu.)   0.017 0.57 0.030 2.16 0.025 0.82 0.029 2.09 0.07 -0.035 -2.33 0.036 4.67 -0.042 -3.05 0.039 5.85 0.07 
Father’s education, lower sec.  -0.023 -1.41 0.067 5.58 -0.022 -1.33 0.066 5.49 0.46 -0.055 -4.12 0.066 6.41 -0.054 -3.86 0.056 5.92 0.41 
Father’s education, upper sec. or higher  0.002 0.11 0.078 9.11 0.009 0.39 0.077 8.93 0.17 -0.054 -3.65 0.042 5.10 -0.049 -3.32 0.034 4.15 0.11 
Wealth quintile 2 (ref. group, quintile1) 0.016 0.74 -0.002 -0.13 0.007 0.34 0.003 0.19 0.22 -0.018 -1.21 0.009 0.96 -0.013 -0.89 0.006 0.65 0.22 
Wealth quintile 3  0.004 0.17 0.035 2.83 -0.004 -0.22 0.037 3.07 0.21 -0.021 -1.30 0.020 1.96 -0.032 -2.08 0.019 2.05 0.20 
Wealth quintile 4  0.009 0.40 0.013 0.86 0.007 0.30 0.023 1.59 0.19 -0.031 -1.98 0.026 2.61 -0.042 -2.85 0.025 2.64 0.17 
Wealth quintile 5  -0.065 -3.57 0.009 0.51 -0.057 -2.88 0.023 1.39 0.15 -0.074 -6.12 0.036 3.89 -0.069 -5.70 0.027 2.77 0.13 
HH occupation in non-agriculture (ref. group, agriculture) -0.025 -1.58 0.025 2.04 -0.029 -1.85 0.026 2.06 0.52 -0.027 -2.11 0.015 1.65 -0.024 -1.86 0.016 1.84 0.51 
With each additional HH member aged 0-5 0.004 0.60 -0.022 -4.14 0.004 0.52 -0.020 -3.67 0.9 0.014 2.23 -0.007 -1.69 0.014 2.27 -0.007 -1.85 1.0 
With each additional HH member aged 6-14 0.000 -0.04 -0.002 -0.59 -0.002 -0.39 -0.003 -0.71 2.6 0.004 0.95 0.004 1.06 0.002 0.52 0.005 1.44 2.7 
With each additional HH member aged 15-59 -0.011 -2.36 -0.004 -1.11 -0.011 -2.42 -0.002 -0.52 2.8 -0.003 -1.05 0.005 2.25 -0.003 -1.00 0.006 2.37 3.0 
With each additional HH member aged 60 or older -0.040 -3.34 0.012 1.29 -0.041 -3.39 0.012 1.32 0.3 -0.012 -1.30 0.008 1.36 -0.008 -0.90 0.006 1.01 0.3 
Western region (ref. group, Northern region) 0.010 0.24 0.067 6.97 -0.010 -0.27 0.067 6.95 0.12 -0.048 -3.03 0.037 4.49 -0.040 -2.30 0.028 3.03 0.09 
Central region  0.019 0.46 0.052 4.01 -0.023 -0.71 0.052 3.88 0.10 -0.065 -4.92 0.042 5.36 -0.074 -6.60 0.040 5.50 0.08 
Accra region  -0.059 -2.11 0.039 2.28 -0.057 -2.05 0.041 2.48 0.09 -0.044 -2.51 0.020 1.69 -0.043 -2.31 0.008 0.53 0.08 
Volta region  0.114 2.00 0.038 2.47 0.092 1.71 0.040 2.62 0.13 -0.038 -2.18 0.033 3.79 -0.023 -1.11 0.032 4.14 0.10 
Eastern region  -0.062 -2.26 0.059 4.51 -0.074 -3.09 0.056 4.09 0.14 0.063 1.95 0.046 5.83 0.062 1.79 0.042 6.00 0.11 
Ashanti region  -0.041 -1.25 0.054 3.34 -0.058 -1.97 0.053 3.15 0.19 -0.082 -5.90 0.054 5.89 -0.075 -5.10 0.044 4.84 0.18 
Brong Ahafo region  -0.098 -5.85 0.063 6.17 -0.099 -6.56 0.061 5.88 0.08 -0.042 -2.51 0.045 6.32 -0.040 -2.46 0.039 5.67 0.08 
Upper East region  0.096 1.31 -0.012 -0.33 0.111 1.47 -0.019 -0.50 0.05 0.018 0.65 -0.033 -1.49 0.028 0.97 -0.027 -1.34 0.08 
Upper West region  0.052 0.66 -0.062 -1.02 0.021 0.28 -0.052 -0.84 0.03 0.138 3.18 -0.010 -0.59 0.136 3.13 -0.001 -0.04 0.09 
Total school expenditure, lowest tercile (ref. group, highest tercile)       -0.015 -0.66 0.017 1.14 0.33     -0.012 -0.74 -0.014 -0.99 0.33 Total school expenditure, middle tercile     0.062 2.81 0.017 1.17 0.34     -0.022 -1.66 0.001 0.12 0.33 Distance to school, 0-29 min. (ref. group, 30 or more min.)     0.024 1.60 -0.010 -0.92 0.51     -0.002 -0.17 0.033 2.63 0.76 Constant -1.86 -2.02 -2.16 -2.34 -1.89 -2.00 -2.33 -2.48  -2.69 -2.92 -1.48 -1.46 -2.51 -2.59 -1.88 -1.72  
Sample of children 2,250 2,214  2,385 2,214  
Source: Author’s regression results based on calculations of GLSS data. Note: The same note applies here as in Table 3. 
